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As environmental regulatory agencies have limited resources to enforce compliance, they tend
to optimize the efficiency of resource allocation by employing targeting strategies. This thesis
investigates the scheduling of Clean Water Act inspections in Illinois and the extent to which
these inspections are memoryless. Using facility level and local EPA agency level data, we
test inspection strategies for common decision factors, such as environmental performance,
and compare them across the different jurisdictions in Illinois.
Our analysis has several key results. First, at the facility level, a majority of inspections
are memoryless, though they are targeted according to local jurisdiction parameters. Second,
although some facilities are targeted for more frequent non-memoryless inspections, none of
our environmental performance parameters seem to influence this sorting. Finally, differ-
ent inspection types are implemented in different ways, suggesting that they serve distinct
purposes in the regulatory process.
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1Introduction And Literature Review
In the United States, environmental regulations are generally decided at the federal level
and the implementation of these regulations falls to federal and state agencies. State en-
vironmental agencies have limited resources and cannot monitor thoroughly all regulated
industries, thus requiring regulators to adopt strategies to try to optimize the efficiency of
their regulatory actions. Different forms of resource allocation strategies may be referred
to as targeting. Targeting generally consists of defining how the components of regulatory
action should be used. Generally, these components are site inspections and enforcement
actions. Numerous empirical studies measure the efficiency of different kinds of targeting
strategies (Laplante and Rilstone, 1996; Helland, 1998; Eckert, 2004). They report how reg-
ulators use past and current environmental performance information from regulated firms
to allocate their limited resources. The key element of these studies is to investigate the
relationships between violations of environmental standards, site inspections, enforcements
and relevant specific characteristics. In this study, we address the following questions: what
kind of targeting strategy is used by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in Illinois
to implement the regulations of the Clean Water Act (CWA), and what are its determinants?
Harrington (1988) is one of the first authors to introduce a theoretical framework for
targeting strategies for environmental compliance. His model consists of sorting polluting
facilities in two groups on the basis of their past environmental performance and allocating
regulatory resources accordingly. The environmental agency applies a greater control on
the ‘bad’ firms, thus increasing inspection probability and expected fines. An increasing
compliance level can be observed from the ‘bad’ firms, however, the ‘good’ firms have a
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lower incentive to comply since the probability of having a violation detected decreases.
Magat and Viscusi (1990) underline the importance of an appropriate enforcement strategy
and intensity given a desired environmental standard and suggest that inspections should
play a role in encouraging the self-reporting of violations.
Following early theoretical contributions on targeting, a number of empirical studies
address two important aspects of environmental regulations. The first issue is the efficiency
of targeting strategies in deterring violations. The second is the expected regulatory pressure
that a plant faces given its polluting activity. Gray and Deily (1996) analyze the interaction
between regulatory decisions and compliance decisions at the plant level for steel plants.
They find enforcement increases compliance, but at the same time compliance behavior
induces fewer enforcement decisions. Although inspections do not always appear to be
effective at increasing compliance, the threat of an inspection and the potential detection of a
violation associated with it have an effect on a firm’s decisions. For example, Earnhart (2004)
finds a significant impact of enforcement on the emission levels of wastewater treatment
plants in Kansas. Conversely, he finds that inspections have no deterrence effect while the
threat of future inspections or enforcement actions has a deterrence effect. Eckert (2004)
shows that past warnings increase the probability of an inspection as well as deter future
violations. Likewise, Magat and Viscusi (1990) and Helland (1998) find that targeting
potential violators has a significant effect on self-reporting of violations but does not lead
to significant deterrence effects on emission levels. Similarly, Laplante and Rilstone (1996)
find that increased inspections induce improved self-reporting of emissions and also find that
both inspections and the threat of inspections reduce pollution emissions. Nadeau (1997)
distinguishes the extent and the duration of harm caused by emissions violations. He shows
that the EPA effectively reduces violation time, notably by allowing for separate strategies
between compliant and non-compliant firms. Shimshack and Ward (2008) suggest that the
randomness and jointness1 of pollutant emissions generate compliance from noncompliant
1Randomness refers to the uncertainty of the extent of pollutant emissions and jointness expresses the
fact that a reduction in emissions of one pollutant is often linked to a reduction in emissions of another.
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firms as well as over-compliance from already compliant firms. Their study of pollutant
discharges of the pulp and paper industry points out how enforcement can generate greater
welfare than expected. Another type of indirect effect of environmental regulation is due
to the spatial location of firms. Eckert and Eckert (2010) use the geospatial dimension of
inspections of petroleum storage sites in Manitoba to demonstrate that inspections can be
spatially correlated and that a plant is less likely to violate when its neighbors have been
recently found to violate.
As these studies suggest, the empirical literature has shown quite similar results regarding
the effects of enforcement actions but contrasting results concerning the effects of regulatory
inspections. One reason for differences in the observed effects of inspections may reside in
differences in the role played by inspections. In his early paper, Harrington (1988) considers
inspections as the only means to detect violations while in most of the studies cited above,
violations are self-reported and inspections have rather a routine control role and a threat-
ening role. In our context, violations are self-reported, and therefore, the role of inspections
is primarily to ensure that facilities are truthfully reporting their emissions and possibly to
detect other kinds of defaults uncovered by reporting requirements. Consequently to this
change in the role of inspection activity, a change in inspection strategy is to be expected.
In a study focused on inspections, Rousseau (2007) distinguishes three different types of
inspection to analyze the strategy of the Flemish environmental agency towards the textile
industry in Flanders (Belgium). In order to determine if the environmental agency uses tar-
geting, she uses survival analysis to estimate the probability of having an inspection given the
amount of time since the last inspection as a function of past compliance behavior, together
with relevant characteristics of the firms. As the different types of inspection2 are estimated
separately, the results show that the factors influencing the different types of inspection are
In particular, Shimshack and Ward (2008) indicate that Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) reductions have
important implications for other pollutant levels.
2Rousseau (2007) distinguishes reactive, routine and project-related inspections and estimates the prob-
ability of inspection for each type to show that the types are treated differently by the inspection agency.
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also different.
Finally, the literature identifies the decision level at which environmental investigation is
decided, generally by distinguishing federal inspections from state inspections. While CWA
regulations are decided at the federal level, implementation frequently falls at the state level
and studies generally assume consistent decisions for regulatory actions within a state. For
example, Earnhart (2004) differentiates federal and state inspections and enforcement threats
and actual actions and shows that the threat of federal actions has a greater deterrence effect.
He also analyzes interactions between federal and state inspections and how they follow each
other. Federal inspections follow state inspections as EPA may collect its own evidence, and
state inspections follow federal inspections as the state agency may revisit after federal
inspections.
The aim of this thesis is to investigate empirically the EPA’s regulatory activities under
the Clean Water Act towards major3 point source polluters in Illinois. We analyze regulatory
inspection decisions from two different angles: at the facility level by investigating each
facility’s inspections history using a fine time scale (quarters) and at the jurisdiction level
by comparing local agencies’ inspection schemes.
There are three major contributions of this thesis. First, although the state EPA imple-
ments CWA, day to day operational decisions are taken by local offices. For example, in
Illinois the state is divided into seven independent jurisdictions. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no published study has considered this finer scale of decision making. Our results
suggest that jurisdiction-level heterogeneity of both industry type and regulators’ prefer-
ences do affect inspection decisions.
Second, both previous studies and the federal EPA’s current recommendations emphasize
the importance of targeting inspections based on previous performance. Our results show a
weak relationship between inspection frequency and location of facilities on impaired water
3Water discharging facilities are divided into two categories: major and non-major, based on specific
rating criteria. Major facilities discharge equal to or greater than one million gallons per day and are
required to self-report their emissions.
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bodies4 and previous violations and enforcement actions. However, there is evidence that
local agencies target according to other parameters such as travel time and industry type.
Third, EPA uses different types of inspections that differ in terms of complexity and
time for both the inspected facilities and the inspector. Previous studies have not carefully
distinguished between inspection types. Our results show that local jurisdictions use different
inspection types in different ways that are consistent with their relative costliness.
The remainder of the thesis is laid out as follows. First we present an institutional
background where we detail implementation of the CWA and practices of local EPA agencies.
Then, we justify and develop the econometric methods used based on results from the
inspection targeting literature. In particular, we describe econometric methods to analyze
the extent to which inspections are memoryless (using a test for a Poisson process and probit
regression) and the determinants of facility level inspection rates (using OLS). A data section
explains the dataset and presents summary statistics. Following this, results are presented
and the thesis concludes with a discussion of results and policy implications.
4A large number of major water dischargers in Illinois discharge in streams listed under the 303(d) list
of impaired waters of the CWA.
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2Institutional Background
Enacted in 1972, the Clean Water Act (CWA) seeks to “restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters.” To serve this goal, the CWA estab-
lished the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). Under the NPDES
program, all facilities discharging pollutants from any point source5 into the waters of the
United States are required to obtain a permit issued by the U.S. EPA or by an authorized
state agency. As a result, all municipal and industrial facilities are issued a permit with
numerical limits for regulated chemicals and are required to self-report their emission levels
monthly. Facilities that cannot meet the NPDES permit limits still have the option to ob-
tain a permit along with a compliance schedule. Compliance schedules allow dischargers to
proceed with the installation of needed abatement technology while continuing to operate in
noncompliance. Failure to meet with compliance schedule deadlines results in a violation.
The Integrated Compliance Information System National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System (ICIS-NPDES) gathers data from a large number of states and territories in a
common database scheme. Different types of violation are recorded in ICIS-NPDES. Non-
compliance with an eﬄuent limit or a failure to report eﬄuent levels automatically results
in a permit violation. Noncompliance with previously scheduled work or compliance levels
is also recorded in the corresponding category.
Inspections and enforcement actions are the two common regulatory actions conducted
by EPA. For our purpose, we are interested in inspections and more particularly in under-
5Point source discharges refer to facilities with an identified connection to water bodies. They typically
comprise industrial facilities and Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW). On the other hand, non-point
sources (e.g. agricultural fields) are exempt from the NPDES program.
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standing how the regulator employs them. NPDES inspections are of several different types.
Reconnaissance inspections With Sampling or withOut Sampling (RWS/ROS) involve a vi-
sual control of the permittee’s installation including the proper use of abatement technology.
Given the short amount of time and procedures needed for RWS and ROS inspections, they
are considered the least costly inspection type. Comprehensive inspections involve a more
stringent review of facilities’ monitoring records, interviews of the personnel, and inspec-
tion of wastewater treatment processes. The principal types are Compliance Evaluation
Inspections (CEI), Compliance Biomonitoring Inspections (CBI), Compliance Sampling In-
spections (CSI), Performance Audit Inspections (PAI), Diagnostic Inspections (DI), and
Toxic Sampling Inspections (XSI). Because of their extensive requirements, comprehensive
inspections are relatively costly for industries as well as for regulators in terms of time and
effort. The federal EPA currently requires that a comprehensive inspection is performed at
least once every two fiscal years for each facility.6
The other type of regulatory actions are enforcement actions. Informal enforcements are
commonly used when facilities are in violation and consist of a warning through a phone call
or a letter. Formal enforcements are less frequent7 and are only applied to a small proportion
of facilities in violation. Formal enforcements are generally administrative compliance orders
and a smaller proportion concerns penalty orders.
While environmental regulations are decided at the federal level through the CWA, EPA
may authorize states, territories, or tribes to implement the NPDES program. In most
of the country, EPA has delegated to states the implementation of the program. States
then operate with little intervention from the federal EPA. As a consequence, there may be
different strategies for enforcing compliance across states corresponding to different political
contexts or different budget constraints. In Illinois, the state EPA performs most regulatory
actions. As mentioned in the previous section, there is also an even more local level of decision
6Frequency goal set by the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance as of 2008.
7In our dataset, there are 247 formal enforcements versus 648 informal enforcements.
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making at the jurisdiction level. A jurisdiction generally features one or two agencies from
which facilities are located within fairly short driving distances. Illinois is divided into seven
non-overlapping jurisdictions (Figure 1).
Finally, as public wastewater treatment plants represent most of the major water dis-
chargers in Illinois, it is relevant to provide a short description of this industry. Most facilities
are old and need to be expanded or rehabilitated and the collection system is over 50 years
old.8 Many public wastewater agencies are financially constrained and have difficulties per-
forming maintenance and upgrade work on their facilities. The EPA maintains relevant
information about the state of wastewater plants as they vary in size and work load. In
particular the ‘critical list’ indicates those plants that are close to reaching their maximum
treatment capacity and cannot be connected to additional sewer systems without a careful
investigation.9 A common expansion practice for current plants is to install pretreatment
equipment. Such installations may be integrated into a compliance schedule.
8A more detailed report is available at: http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/node/182
9There is also a ‘restricted list’ concerning plants that have reached their maximum capacity, but none
of the major facilities in Illinois is on the restrited list.
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3Methods
We are concerned with the scheduling and determinants of inspections by local regulatory
agencies. The federal EPA clearly states that the goal of CWA inspections is to “ensure and
document whether entities possessing NPDES permits are complying with their CWA obli-
gations.”10 It also recommends state administrators to “direct resources towards the most
important noncompliance and environmental problems.” On the other hand, local agencies
are budget constrained, must meet minimum frequencies for comprehensive inspections for
all facilities, and may be concerned with potential strategic behavior from facilities. The
interaction of these features of the local regulatory process guides our choice of econometric
strategy.
As seen before, the timing of inspections can be a function of firms’ environmental per-
formance (Rousseau, 2007) and the threat of future inspections can deter the occurrence of
violations as well as decrease their duration. In some cases, the regulator may lack relevant
information about firms’ environmental performance or face uncertainty regarding when
non-compliance may occur.11 Also, from facilities’ point of view, uncertainty regarding the
timing of the next inspection may give an incentive for staying constantly in compliance,
even after a recent inspection.
We assume that a strategic firm is particularly interested in the probability of having an
inspection at a given time P (It). If inspection probabilities vary over time in a way that is
predictable to the firm, the firm will have time varying incentives to adjust its effort. This
10Documents related to CWA inspections available, as of June 2012, at:
http://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/cwa/
11In particular, heavy rainfall events may cause greater pollution of water bodies.
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is a challenge for a budget constrained regulator that cannot inspect all facilities regularly.
One solution for the regulator would be not to condition the inspection probability on the
time since the last inspection:
P (It) = P (It|It−1) (3.1)
Note that even if inspections are memoryless, as equation (3.1) suggests, regulators can
still target facilities according to their environmental performance. In the case of noncom-
pliant facilities, more frequent memoryless inspections could encourage a faster return to
compliance. In the case of compliant facilities, less frequent memoryless inspections would
encourage the maintenance of compliance even after a recent inspection. Then, the proba-
bility of inspection would be constant at each facility and as a consequence the regulatory
pressure would be the same at any time t for that facility.
The property of memorylessness is equivalent to having inspection times generated by
a Poisson process. In a theoretical study on the availability of maintained systems subject
to random failures, Wortman and Klutke (1994) explain how a random inspection strategy,
based on a Poisson process, can maintain a constant availability. This idea can be transferred
to environmental inspections: when information is reduced or uncertain, the regulator could
adopt a Poisson process to inspect facilities.12
For these reasons, we test if inspections are memoryless, which is equivalent to testing the
hypothesis that the regulator does not choose any particular times to inspect each facility or
that each facility is inspected randomly over time. Our analysis first tests if the history of
inspections of each facility is compatible with a Poisson process. If the times of inspections
are independent, we can consider that the regulator randomly chooses the time when a
facility is inspected. Thus, this test allows us to sort between the facilities that are randomly
inspected over time and those that are not. Note that this methodology differs from survival
analysis and, to the best of our knowledge, has not been used in environmental economics.
12When inspections are not a response to already known violations, a Poisson process could be used to
maximize the findings of inspections, particularly in the case of reconnaissance inspections.
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A Poisson process refers to a series of events for which the time between two events has a
parameterized exponential distribution (Poisson distribution). In order to test for a Poisson
process, we choose to use the Conditional Chi-squared statistic described in equation (3.2)
where X is a random variable, in our case the number of inspections per quarter. Under
the null hypothesis described in equation (3.3) TCC has a Chi-square distribution with n− 1





 H0 : Xi ∼ Poiss(λi), λ1 = ... = λnHa : Xi ∼ Poiss(λi), ∑(λi − λ¯)2 > 0 (3.3)
This methodology is described by Cochran (1954) as the test of variance for the Poisson
distribution and has proven to be reasonably sensitive for this purpose. Under the null
hypothesis, we cannot reject that the random variable X is drawn from a Poisson distribution
of mean λ, and under the alternative hypothesis, we reject that the observations of X are
issued from the same Poisson distribution. This procedure enables us to consider individually
each facility in the sample and to test if each sequence of inspections is compatible with a
Poisson process.
It is relevant to note that failing to reject the hypothesis that inspections are compatible
with a Poisson process does not mean that inspections are totally random and that the
regulator does not have a targeting strategy. Indeed, it implies, as mentioned before, that
inspections are memoryless13 and that, in our model, the number of quarterly inspections
is exponentially distributed with parameter λ.14 In other words, the regulator chooses the
rate of inspections for each facility as a result of his targeting strategy. In the following part
of this study, we are interested in investigating the determinants of the rate of inspections.
13Or, the time intervals between two inspections are independent random variables.
14The mean number of inspections per quarter is then λ.
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We calculate the rate of inspections as the mean number of inspections per quarter. As this
rate is a continuous variable, we choose to use an OLS model with the rate of inspection as
the dependent variable in order to investigate what facility level characteristics are involved
in the regulator’s choice. With such a model, we seek to verify if our data are compatible
with a targeting strategy of increased pressure towards noncompliant facilities (Magat and
Viscusi, 1990).
For those facilities whose inspections are consistent with a Poisson process, we regress
the rate of inspection r using facility level attributes. Equation (3.4) describes our OLS
regression model where ri is the rate of inspection for facility i and ri = λi, RAi is a vector
representing counts of regulatory actions towards facility i over the period, Ti is the travel
time faced by the regulator to reach facility i, Ii is a vector of binary variables indicating
the industry type of facility i (wastewater treatment plant, electric services, plastic industry,
others), and µi is the error term. Since we differentiate reconnaissance and comprehensive
inspections, ri is either the rate of reconnaissance inspections or the rate of comprehensive
inspections.
ri = α + βRAi + γTi + δIi + µi (3.4)
Since environmental inspections and regulatory actions are parallel processes over time,
decisions can be made by the regulator regarding both processes simultaneously. In order to
avoid endogeneity issues, we estimate the rate of inspection using prior regulatory actions.
Thus, variables in RAi are lagged. Ultimately, this model permits estimation of factors
influencing the inspectors’ decisions about how much regulatory pressure should be applied
on each plant. As we estimate reconnaissance and comprehensive inspections separately, we
are able to reveal any difference in the factors influencing inspection frequency for the two
types of control.
In our first modeling approach, we build on previous economic theory that supports
12
the determination of groups within the industry (Harrington, 1988; Magat and Viscusi,
1990) and separates plants according to environmental performance. In our second modeling
approach, we inspect how information available to the regulator may be used to produce
such a sorting. In particular, prior environmental performance is taken into account as we
test the importance of the most common chemicals involved in water quality evaluation in
the regulator’s decision. Our choice of variables includes cumulative violation or enforcement
counts as encountered in Rousseau (2007) or Eckert (2004) and chemical-specific violations
as in Laplante and Rilstone (1996) or Earnhart (2004), so that we are able to investigate the
precision level or pollutant specific concerns of the regulator in his decision process. Notably,
the current EPA recommendations for targeting insist on general noncompliance, but also
emphasize site impairment (i.e. impaired receiving water bodies) that generally relates to
pollution from wastewater treatment plants with specific pollutants (e.g. BOD, coliform).
Because the levels of different pollutants are often linked, the regulator may focus only on
a few of them believed to be the best indicators of plants’ behavior. In order to measure
if individual pollutant events make a difference, we estimate the probability for facilities to
belong to the group that is not inspected randomly over time. If inspections do not occur
randomly over time, we suppose that the regulator is reactive to certain parameters or events
and adjusts his rate of inspection accordingly. Thus, we use a probit model containing lagged
individual pollutant violation events and enforcement events.
P (Facilityi ∈ NotRandom) =β0 + β1FormalEnfi + β2InformalEnfi
+ β3BODi + β4Chlorinei + β5Coliformsi
+ β6TSSi + β7Overduei + νi (3.5)
Equation (3.5) describes the probit model discussed above. Regressors are composed of
formal and informal enforcement counts, violation counts of three common pollutants: BOD,
13
chlorine, and fecal coliform, and violation counts of overdue monitoring reports.
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4Data
The data used in this study are composed of environmental performance records and geospa-
tial information. The environmental performance data are extracted from the EPA’s Inte-
grated Compliance Information System-NPDES (ICIS-NPDES). This database comprises
records for all discharging facilities in the United States.15 These facilities are divided into
two categories: major and non-major facilities, according to specific ratings criteria devel-
oped by EPA or States. Major facilities include facilities discharging equal to or greater
than one million gallons per day. Such facilities are required to self-report their emissions
levels. Reporting is voluntary for non-major facilities and as a result emissions data are
often missing. In this thesis, we use only major facility data for consistency. Even though
non-major facilities are more numerous, emissions from major facilities constitute the largest
proportion of emissions and are thus more important to the regulator.
This study focuses on the 275 major facilities located in Illinois, their environmental
performance and the related inspection activity of the EPA during the period 2001-2009. As
Figure 1 shows, the state of Illinois is divided into seven jurisdictions and each jurisdiction is
locally supervised by an EPA office in charge of monitoring regulated facilities. The facilities
are unevenly concentrated in space with five jurisdictions having a lower concentration of
facilities and the other two having a higher concentration. This fact reflects the dispari-
ties between rural and urban areas. Indeed, the jurisdiction comprising the Chicago area
concentrates a greater number of facilities compared to the other jurisdictions.
15The modernized ICIS-NPDES is used by a large proportion of U.S. states and territories, although the
older Permit Compliance System (PCS) is still used in the rest of the country.
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Our primary variable of interest represents the inspection activity of the regulator. Based
on the date of all inspection events, we aggregate inspections by quarter and use the count of
inspections per quarter. We consider inspection types separately so that inspection counts
are grouped by type: reconnaissance and comprehensive. During the first part of the analysis,
we test for a Poisson process in the occurrences of inspections over time. The result of that
test is then represented in a binary variable used in the next stages of the study with a zero
value when the series is compatible with a Poisson process and a value of one when it is not.
Secondly, a set of variables describes facilities’ characteristics. Three binary variables
indicate the type of industry: sewerage systems, electric services, and plastic materials
plants. The other types of plants are not flagged in the analysis. In order to signal whether
or not a plant is located in a sensitive area, we use a binary variable indicating whether the
plant is discharging in a stream listed under the 303(d) list of impaired waters of the CWA.16
We also use dummy variables to account for the jurisdiction each facility belongs to. The
last characteristic is the travel time from the local EPA agency to the facility. We favor
travel time over distance in order to represent better the difference in travel cost between
rural and urban areas for the regulator. Travel time is calculated using the Directions tool
of Google Maps.
Finally, a set of variables denotes facilities’ environmental performance over time. Facility
level violations, enforcement actions, and penalty fines are reported per year. Violations are
reported for the most important water quality pollutants such as chlorine, fecal coliform,
nitrogen, BOD (5-day BOD at 20◦C), TSS, and pH. Violations are also recorded when self-
reports of emissions are overdue. Enforcement actions are represented by three variables to
distinguish the count of informal enforcements, the count of formal enforcements, and the
sum of penalties accompanying a formal enforcement. All these variables are aggregated by
year so that we can use them as lagged values.
16The CWA requires water bodies not meeting water quality standards to be listed. Water bodies in the
303(d) list are prioritized for restoration and protected by Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) programs.
Currently the U.S has 14,153 waters on the 303(d) list, including 1,057 in Illinois.
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As Table 1 shows, most of the major facilities are wastewater treatment plants17 (208/275),
followed by electric services plants (30/275). We also note that more than 50% of the major
facilities discharge into impaired waters. Given CWA requirements for impaired waters, we
expect these facilities to receive more oversight from the regulator. It is not surprising that
travel time is variable across facilities as facilities are distributed across jurisdictions (Figure
1). Only jurisdiction 3 presents two obvious industrial spatial clusters, though each of them
comprises an EPA agency.
Between 2001 and 2009, the regulator performed 2,519 comprehensive inspections and
11,776 reconnaissance inspections. This activity was focused on wastewater facilities with
respectively 2,025 and 9,849 inspections for comprehensive and reconnaissance. Note that
there is a decreasing trend in the amount of inspections during our sample time frame with
reconnaissance inspections strongly declining as Figure 2 shows. The data also reveal that
the regulator increased water sampling during reconnaissance inspections.18
Table 1 also provides violation records as two separate types: overdue violations and limit
exceedance violations. An overdue violation is recorded when a facility fails to transmit all
its required monitoring values to EPA. An exceedance violation is recorded when a facility
reports emission levels greater than the value specified by its NPDES permit; a percentage of
exceedance is associated with the violation record. Wastewater treatment plants account for
most of the exceedance violations with 5,652 violations. These violations are also on average
greater in exceedance percentage than for other industries. This may be attributed to the
uncertainty of weather events and the variability of water flows as well as the limited capacity
of wastewater treatment plants, thus making the wastewater industry an important concern
for the regulator. As opposed to other studies (Rousseau, 2007), violations are automatically
generated and are not necessarily linked to inspections.
The unit of observation used to count inspections is a quarter of a year. We believe that
17Table 2 presents specific variables for this industry.
18Inspections records show that ROS are replaced by RWS over time.
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using quarterly data is a realistic approach considering that inspections may not happen
more than a few times a year for most facilities. Table 3 shows when violations occur across
quarters. As expected, water pollution shows some seasonality effects for limit exceedance
violations. This is particularly observable for chlorine and coliform with higher counts for
quarters 3 and 4 (April to June and July to September) which correspond to periods when
rainfall is heavier and when wastewater treatment plants may face greater loads. Values for
coliform are significantly greater from April to September at the 0.001 level and values for
chlorine are greater at least at the 0.1 level. Surprisingly, overdue violation counts increase
over the calendar year and may be linked to different levels of administrative or financial
constraints as the year progresses.
The last regulatory action reported in this study is enforcement actions. We observe
that violations do not necessarily lead to enforcement actions, even informal ones, as the
count of enforcements is less than that of violations. Perhaps the regulator considers that
the issuance of a violation is a sufficient signal to the industry, or that if a facility receives
an enforcement after a violation, it will not be enforced again for its following violations.
We can also suppose that enforcements concern only the worst violations with high level of
exceedance. Another explanation for the lower number of actions is they are very costly to
the regulator. The same pattern is observed with financial penalties as formal enforcement
actions are not necessarily accompanied by a penalty. Only 23 formal enforcements in the
wastewater industry out of 247 resulted in a total $74 million in penalties. Penalties are
generally issued after a court decision which could explain their scarcity. The large number
in the righthand column of Table 1 ($201 million) is entirely due to a single petroleum plant.
Finally, Table 4 presents the data as used in our analysis. We use annual formal and
informal enforcement counts as well as financial penalties from 2001 to 2004 to estimate
regulatory actions from 2005 to 2009. This lag between variables is adopted in order to
avoid endogeneity. Similarly, we use counts of violations for relevant pollutants from 2001 to





We begin by reporting the results for the test of variance for the Poisson distribution (Equa-
tion 3.2). Recall that the analysis is carried out using facility-level inspection data. For
each jurisdiction, Table 5 presents the number of facilities for which the hypothesis that
inspections are memoryless can be rejected (i.e. are significantly different from a Poisson
process) over the period 2001 to 2009. For each type of inspection, the proportion of all
facilities is given as well as the proportion among wastewater treatment plants. In the case
of reconnaissance inspections, almost all inspection timings seem to be memoryless. In the
case of comprehensive inspections the proportion of facilities for which the hypothesis that
inspections are memoryless can be rejected is between 20% and 50%. This means that for
this subset of facilities, the probability of a comprehensive inspection is conditioned on the
time since the last inspection. Also, wastewater treatment plants do not seem to be treated
differently as their proportions resemble the total proportions (Table 5). This trend sug-
gests that as the cost of inspections increases, the regulator increases the number of facilities
non-randomly inspected.
The most striking result is the proportion of non-memoryless reconnaissance inspections
in jurisdiction 3 (81%), corresponding to the Peoria area in western Illinois. As mentioned
before, this jurisdiction presents some distinct characteristics. It has two spatial clusters of
facilities, each of them having an EPA agency near to them. We also observe the greatest
decrease in the average number of inspections over time in this jurisdiction (see Table A.1).
These two facts suggest that jurisdiction 3 has adopted different targeting strategies than
seen in other jurisdictions.
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Overall, we note the difference between the two types of inspections. At the facility level,
reconnaissance inspections are randomly distributed over time. This type of inspection can
serve as a way to maintain a threat of receiving an intervention (Earnhart, 2004). This
practice also encourages self-reporting (Magat and Viscusi, 1990; Laplante and Rilstone,
1996; Helland, 1998) as a facility is unable to predict its next inspection.
On the other hand, scheduling comprehensive inspections may have different factors as
nearly one out of three facilities has inspections that are not memoryless. Comprehensive
inspections have different purposes than reconnaissance inspections. In particular, the state
regulator is required to perform at least one comprehensive inspection every two years for
each facility. Comprehensive inspections also play an important role in enforcing environ-
mental compliance. Because they involve a rigorous scrutiny of facilities’ equipment and
records, they may reveal concealed violations. Moreover, given their higher cost, it is not
surprising that the regulator employs a different scheduling strategy. It is interesting to note
that having memoryless comprehensive inspections and having memoryless reconnaissance
inspections are significantly independent. The Pearson Chi-squared test for dependence is
equal to χ2 = 5.30e− 3 with p value = 0.94, so we cannot reject the hypothesis that memo-
ryless reconnaissance inspections over time and memoryless comprehensive inspections over
time are independent,19 which reinforces the idea that the two types have different purposes
for the regulator.
Theoretical results have shown that memoryless inspections are desirable when the un-
derlying failure rate is random (Wortman and Klutke, 1994). Next, we analyze whether
or not the occurrences of violations reported by facilities are memoryless (Table 6). We
observe that for most facilities, overdue violations and limit exceedance violations are not
randomly distributed in time. This suggests that those events are either smoothly distributed
over time or concentrated at certain dates. Since a lot of facilities (e.g. wastewater) may
have under-dimensioned equipment and some major weather events may overload plants’
19See Appendix A for complete independence test results.
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treatment capacity, both scenarios are plausible. Conversely, when looking at particular
pollutant violations we can observe a variety of patterns (Table 6). Overall, chlorine and
BOD5 violations appear to be randomly distributed over time. Depending on jurisdiction,
coliform violations are more or less randomly distributed, with higher rates of non-random
patterns in jurisdiction 1, 3, and 7. This may be due to disparities in wastewater treatment
equipment.20 Concerning TSS, a consistent 30-40% of facilities have non-randomly occurring
violations. Overall, violations do not appear to be randomly distributed over time, which
is an advantage for the regulator if he wants to follow up on violations. However, if the
regulator focuses on particular pollutants (e.g. BOD5), his strategy should account for the
random character of their occurrences.
It is interesting to note that, for the physical and chemical violation types, the highest
rates of non-memoryless violations occur in jurisdiction 3. Because this pattern is seen for
both wastewater and other facilities, this may be interpreted as consistent with strategic
behavior in emissions violations by facilities.
Table 7 presents OLS estimations for our inspection rate model. The purpose of this
model is to explain the rate of inspection for facilities that were identified as having memory-
less inspections in the previous part. We use the methodology presented above to determine
which facilities have a sequence of inspections consistent with a Poisson process over a three
year period. Then we create several subsets of our dataset in order to extract facility-level
observations. Finally, we calculate the quarterly average rate of inspection during the same
three year period to obtain the response variable. The model is completed with lagged
enforcement count variables, travel time in minutes, and industry-specific binary variables.
The results are presented for different periods of the response variable for robustness21
and we observe some consistent outcomes. Again, we note that the two types of inspection
exhibit important differences.
20Coliform violations concern only the wastewater treatment industry.
21See Appendix A for more detailed results.
22
We find heteroskedasticity for both reconnaissance rate estimations using the Breusch-
Pagan test, with p values of 0.01 and 0.0004. Therefore, we adjust the standard errors with
White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator. The other two estimations for comprehen-
sive inspection rates do not present any sign of heteroskedasticity. Models are also tested for
multicollinearity using the Variance Inflation Factor and show no evidence of multicollinear-
ity (we observe VIF values no greater than 2.3).
The rate for reconnaissance inspections appears to be significantly positively correlated
with lagged informal enforcements of a prior year, indicating that the regulator may be
increasing effort towards those facilities that have recently been warned. We note that in-
formal enforcements from 2003 are significant in both time settings, which suggests that the
regulator is interested in events that occurred during 2003 rather than in events occurring
with a specific lag. None of the formal enforcement variables are significant indicating that
reconnaissance inspections may not be considered as follow-up visits after an administrative
decision. Unsurprisingly, we note that inspection rate is negatively correlated with travel
time. It is likely that for budget or time constraints, further distances discourage the regula-
tor and there may be a trade-off between spending time driving and spending time inspecting
as reconnaissance inspections are rather short in time. As the coefficient of the travel time
variable is −0.004, we estimate that a facility located 100 minutes further away from the EPA
agency has 1.6 less inspections per year compared to a facility located nearer to the agency.
Note that previous studies using state level data have not been able to use travel time as a
variable because the location of the inspectors was not defined. Concerning industry type,
it appears that wastewater treatment plants are more subject to reconnaissance inspections.
Many reasons may motivate the regulator to visit this industry more frequently, notably
because it has a large pollution potential and its equipment requires careful attention and
operation. Moreover this industry is particularly challenged by uncertainty due to weather
events. Our results are consistent with the intuition given by Rousseau (2007) who finds
that, for certain lags, violations significantly increase (or decrease) the probability of routine
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inspections.
Comprehensive inspection rates present some similarities concerning past enforcement
records. Although in this analysis no coefficient for informal enforcement is significant, some
lagged formal enforcements have weak positive significance. As opposed to reconnaissance
inspections, comprehensive inspections may serve as follow-up visits after a formal enforce-
ment is issued, requiring the regulator to inspect facilities more thoroughly. However, this
significance of formal enforcement is not consistent across time settings (Table 7). Travel
time and wastewater variables are not as significant compared to reconnaissance inspections
with coefficients an order of magnitude less. Indeed, the mandatory character of compre-
hensive inspections may reduce the importance of travel cost, while wastewater treatment
plants may not require increased comprehensive inspection effort.
We now consider differences between facilities with and without memoryless comprehen-
sive inspections.22 For comprehensive inspections during the period 2005 to 2009 the rate
of inspection is significantly higher for non-memoryless inspections, with an average of 0.29
inspections per quarter, versus 0.21 memoryless inspections per quarter. The Welch t-test
for the difference in means is t = 3.00 and p value = 3.65e-3. This trend is consistent for
our different time periods.
The higher rate of comprehensive inspections for facilities with non-memoryless compre-
hensive inspections suggests that the regulator targets these facilities by allocating more of
his resources towards them. Recall also that in all jurisdictions during 2001 to 2009, 20
to 50% of facilities have non-memoryless comprehensive inspections (Table 5). Next, we
use shorter intervals to observe whether facilities enter and exit the non-memoryless group.
We observe respectively 59, 48, and 49 non-memoryless patterns over the periods 2003-07,
2004-08, and 2005-09, with a turnover of 30.5% between the first two periods, 25% between
the two last ones, and finally with 52.5% of the initial group remaining through all periods.
22Differences in rates of reconnaissance inspections are significant but almost all non-memoryless inspec-
tions are in jurisdiction 3, which has a low average reconnaissance inspection frequency.
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This suggests that when a facility is in the non-memoryless group (i.e. the targeted group),
it tends to stay in this group in the following periods. Consequently, the regulator appears
to be targeting the same facilities for higher inspection frequencies.
To try to understand the determinants of this targeting, we use a probit model to es-
timate the probability of non-memoryless comprehensive inspections. Building on previous
literature (Eckert, 2004; Earnhart, 2004; Rousseau, 2007) as well as EPA’s current recom-
mendations for targeting we use a set of environmental performance variables and facility
characteristic variables. We also separate the dataset into two groups in order to investigate
wastewater treatment plants separately to allow the usage of a set of explanatory variables
specific to wastewater plants.
Both previous literature and EPA’s current recommendations claim that targeting should
be applied to noncompliant facilities and environmental problems. However, the results of
our estimations do not show any consistent significant estimates for environmental perfor-
mance variables or enforcement action variables (Tables 8 and 9). Similarly, impaired water
body dummies are not significant. Other tested variables (not shown in the tables) include
travel time and percentage of minorities within three miles; neither of these variables is sig-
nificant. Wastewater treatment plant-specific variables (e.g. flow capacity, inflow) also do
not provide any evidence (Table 8). Overall, the information provided by the ICIS-NPDES
does not permit us to identify the determinants of targeting for comprehensive inspections.
Our results show that although there is a sub group of facilities that are targeted for
higher inspection frequencies over long periods, none of the environmental performance fac-
tors that we would expect to be determinants of targeting are significant. This suggests
that the local jurisdictions are using information that is not available in the ICIS-NPDES
database for targeting. Potential relevant variables involved in targeting for this type of
inspection may be other facility characteristics that are not publicly available or other types
of variable such as citizen complaints, demographics, or other political factors.
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6Discussion And Concluding Remarks
Economic theory indicates that environmental agencies should use targeting in order to in-
crease compliance. This targeting should involve an analysis of environmental performance
and specific characteristics of firms to determine an adapted assignment of regulatory agen-
cies’ limited resources.
In this thesis, we look for evidence of a sorting strategy of water-polluting facilities by
the regulator. We consider inspections performed under the Clean Water Act in the seven
local EPA jurisdictions of Illinois. For the period 2001 to 2009, we analyze inspection and
violation data for 275 facilities classified as major water dischargers and regulated under the
Clean Water Act. We report three main results.
First, we take into account the planning of inspections for each facility and identify those
inspection schemes that are memoryless. With the exception of one jurisdiction, we find
that reconnaissance inspections (the quickest, cheapest inspection type) are memoryless.
For these inspections, we find that the rate of inspection increases for facilities closer to the
local EPA agency, for wastewater treatment plants, and for facilities that previously received
warnings. Interestingly, we find that in the jurisdictions that have memoryless reconnaissance
inspections, violations of physical and chemical parameters tend to be memoryless too. In
the one jurisdiction that has mostly non-memoryless reconnaissance inspections, a higher
proportion of violations are non-memoryless too, which may indicate strategic behavior by
facilities.
On the other hand, a significant proportion of comprehensive inspections is found not
to be memoryless, so that inspections are not randomly distributed over time at the facility
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level. Memoryless comprehensive inspections, though, have higher inspection frequencies
for the wastewater industry and shorter travel time. Together these results echo Rousseau
(2007) by showing that different inspection types serve different purposes in the regulator’s
strategy. Future work on understanding regulatory objectives should account for different
inspection types.
Second, non-memoryless comprehensive inspections occur at a higher frequency than
memoryless comprehensive inspections which suggests that the regulator is targeting a subset
of facilities. This kind of targeting is consistent with previous theoretical studies. Targeting
is encouraged by EPA’s current guidelines. However, we cannot identify any determinant
for the observed targeting within the data extracted from the ICIS-NPDES database, such
as inspection, enforcement, and violation histories, as well as firms’ characteristics, such as
discharging into an impaired water body. This suggests the local agencies are using other
information in targeting facilities for inspections.
Third, even though most inspection schedules are memoryless, this does not mean that
there is no targeting. In particular, we find that wastewater treatment plants and facilities
that are located closer to local offices are inspected more frequently. This result shows
that jurisdiction level parameters are important in determining regulatory behavior. Future
studies should be undertaken at the jurisdiction level if possible.
The implications of this study concern primarily inspection strategies and resource al-
location. At the local level jurisdictions do not seem to respond to parameters emphasized
in EPA’s current targeting recommendations and previous theoretical studies (Harrington,
1988; Magat and Viscusi, 1990). Budget constraints seem to be a limiting factor in the reg-
ulator’s activity as both our findings for travel time and the general decrease in inspection
frequencies over the years suggest. Nevertheless, inspections remain an important means of
ensuring that wastewater treatment equipment is working properly. This role is particularly
important in the wastewater industry because of limited treatment capacity and uncertain
eﬄuent concentrations due to variable wet weather flows. However, our results do not sug-
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gest that the regulator allocates more resources to noncompliant plants. Since the majority
of plants are publicly owned, the regulator may not want to spend resources where the major
concern is to upgrade or replace old equipment.
As the determinants of targeting for comprehensive inspections remain unclear, future
work may investigate other variables such as detailed demographic parameters or political
actions from the public or from interest groups. Also, because Illinois uses a combination of
reconnaissance and comprehensive inspections, it may be interesting to compare targeting
strategies with other states using the same combination of types of inspection or to other
states using only comprehensive inspections. Another step in the analysis of inspection
activity would be to interview a sample of EPA inspection officers to collect data about the
objectives, demands, and contraints related to their activity. From a broader perspective,
as we observe that travel time plays an important role in inspectors’ activity, we could
change the jurisdictions’ boundaries and the inherent distribution of facilities within them
and optimize the assignment of facilities to EPA agencies taking into account inspection
schedules and travel time.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Major Facilities in Illinois
Industry Wastewater Electric Plastic & Resin Other
Count 208 30 6 31
Impaired 122 21 5 19
Travel Time Mean 55.37 62.42 80.01 53.00
(minutes) SD 28.06 31.66 23.95 31.11
Min 5.45 11.53 51.10 16.67
Max 140.38 120.38 114.18 130.28
Inspection Compr. 2025 208 51 235
Recon. 9849 983 168 776
Violation Overdue 1730 262 89 361
Exceed. 5652 265 171 724
Enforcement Informal 648 34 11 84
Formal 247 8 7 33
Penalty Count 23 2 2 2
($) Sum 74,776,808 13,000 8,187,951 201,914,089
Mean 302,740.11 1,625.00 1,169,707.29 6,118,608.76
SD 3,816,508.09 3,543.10 3,090,595.70 35,135,269.92
Upper table shows facility related values.
Lower table shows regulatory action values over the industry.
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Table 2: Complementary Summary Statistics for Wastewater Treatment Plants in Illinois
Count Mean SD Min Max
Facilities 208





1 (Non) Publicly Owned Treatment Works.
Table 3: Seasonality of Violations
Quarter1 Overdue Limit TSS Chlorine2 BOD5 Coliforms
3
1 442 1666 501 34 90 255
2 508 1901 327 89 80 449
3 681 1754 239 87 45 457
4 811 1491 367 64 80 295
1 Values represent sums per quarter during 2001-2009.
2 Regression of yearly counts with quarter dummies show that quarter 2 and 3 are
significantly greater than quarter 1 at the 0.001 level and than quarter 4 at the 0.1 level.
3 Values for quarter 2 and 3 are significantly greater than 1 and 4 at the 0.001 level.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Regulatory Action
Mean SD Max Min
Formal 2001 0.11 0.36 2 0
Formal 2002 0.10 0.31 2 0
Formal 2003 0.08 0.31 2 0
Formal 2004 0.11 0.35 2 0
Informal 2001 0.39 0.75 5 0
Informal 2002 0.39 0.70 4 0
Informal 2003 0.41 0.77 5 0
Informal 2004 0.25 0.56 2 0
Overdue 2001 0.56 2.33 24 0
Overdue 2002 0.59 2.35 33 0
Overdue 2003 0.58 1.71 14 0
Overdue 2004 0.64 2.01 21 0
Chlorine 2001 0.13 0.73 10 0
Chlorine 2002 0.15 0.64 8 0
Chlorine 2003 0.15 0.56 6 0
Chlorine 2004 0.10 0.50 6 0
BOD5 2001 0.23 2.10 31 0
BOD5 2002 0.24 1.65 22 0
BOD5 2003 0.17 0.92 9 0
BOD5 2004 0.13 0.75 8 0
Coliform 2001 0.52 1.69 12 0
Coliform 2002 0.61 1.68 12 0
Coliform 2003 0.47 1.44 12 0
Coliform 2004 0.61 1.71 12 0
TSS 2001 0.55 2.05 19 0
TSS 2002 0.60 1.74 13 0
TSS 2003 0.49 1.46 13 0
TSS 2004 0.45 1.24 9 0
Comp. Insp. Rate 2003-07 0.26 0.13 0.80 0
Comp. Insp. Rate 2004-08 0.25 0.12 0.75 0
Comp. Insp. Rate 2005-09 0.23 0.11 0.70 0
Reco. Insp. Rate 2003-07 1.28 0.83 3.35 0
Reco. Insp. Rate 2004-08 1.05 0.78 3.35 0
Reco. Insp. Rate 2005-09 0.86 0.73 3.25 0
Upper section shows formal and informal enforcements.
Middle section shows specific pollutants.
Lower section shows inspection rates for randomly inspected facilities.
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Table 5: Non-Memoryless Inspections of Facilities (Proportions)
Facilities1 Recon. Insp.2 Compr. Insp.2
Jurisdiction Total Wastewater Total Wastewater Total Wastewater
1 28 21 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.38
2 121 98 0.02 0.00 0.19 0.18
3 32 21 0.81 0.81 0.50 0.48
4 25 17 0.04 0.06 0.36 0.47
5 20 13 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.31
6 28 21 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.52
7 21 17 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.47
1 Counts of facilities. Values are presented for all facilities (Total) and for wasterwater
treatment plants only (Wastewater).
2 Proportions of facilities with non-memoryless inspections. Values are presented for all
facilities (Total) and for wasterwater treatment plants only (Wastewater).
Table 6: Non-Memoryless Violations (Proportions)
Jurisdiction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Facilities T 28 121 32 25 20 28 21
W 21 98 21 17 13 21 17
Overdue T 0.79 0.67 0.62 0.80 0.85 0.68 0.33
W 0.76 0.67 0.48 0.76 0.77 0.67 0.29
Limit T 0.61 0.60 0.78 0.52 0.60 0.75 0.67
W 0.62 0.59 0.81 0.53 0.69 0.71 0.65
TSS T 0.29 0.37 0.56 0.28 0.45 0.39 0.43
W 0.38 0.38 0.57 0.24 0.38 0.33 0.41
Chlorine T 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.00
W 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.00
BOD5 T 0.04 0.06 0.22 0.12 0.15 0.04 0.05
W 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00
Coliforms T 0.18 0.12 0.31 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.29
W 0.24 0.14 0.48 0.18 0.08 0.10 0.35
T: Total, W: Wastewater only
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Table 7: OLS Regression of the Rate of Inspection
Recon. 2004-08 Recon. 2005-09 Comp. 2004-08 Comp. 2005-09
(Intercept) 0.629∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.155) (0.025) (0.024)
Formal 2002 0.006 0.034
(0.144) (0.024)
Formal 2003 −0.271 −0.137 0.060∗∗ 0.031
(0.161) (0.207) (0.020) (0.020)
Formal 2004 −0.221 0.031
(0.135) (0.019)
Informal 2002 0.110 0.004
(0.074) (0.011)
Informal 2003 0.242∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗ −0.009 −0.004
(0.067) (0.067) (0.009) (0.009)
Informal 2004 −0.002 −0.024∗
(0.098) (0.012)
Travel Time (min) −0.004∗ −0.004∗∗ −5.024e−4∗ −3.802e−4
(0.002) (0.002) (2.251e−4) (2.218e−4)
Wastewater 0.676∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.051∗ 0.051∗
(0.150) (0.130) (0.022) (0.021)
Electric 0.362 0.376∗ 0.001 0.013
(0.188) (0.167) (0.028) (0.027)
Plastic 0.219 0.221 0.033 −0.014
(0.293) (0.317) (0.048) (0.047)
Log-likelihood −269.785 −229.953 213.377 217.890
N 248 215 227 226
standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 8: Probability of Non-Memoryless Comprehensive Inspections for Wastewater Facili-
ties
Comp. 2003-07 Comp. 2004-08 Comp. 2005-09
(Intercept) −0.780∗∗∗ −0.947∗∗∗ −0.920∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.187) (0.192)
Impaired −0.547∗∗ −0.357 −0.211
(0.212) (0.223) (0.220)
Design Flow −0.004 −0.008 −0.005
(million Gal/Day) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008)
NON-POTW1 0.121 −4.274 0.176
(0.673) (262.395) (0.662)
Pretreatment 0.722∗∗ 0.424 0.140
(0.223) (0.243) (0.242)
Critical −0.129 −0.883 −0.722
(0.420) (0.606) (0.552)
Informal 2001 0.325∗∗ 0.217 0.452∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.127) (0.131)
Informal 2002 0.025 0.153 −0.007
(0.143) (0.140) (0.148)




Log-likelihood −103.141 −91.347 −92.529
N 208 208 208
standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
1 Non Public Owned Treatment Works.
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Table 9: Probability of Non-Memoryless Comprehensive Inspections for Other Facilities
Comp. 2003-07 Comp. 2004-08 Comp. 2005-09
(Intercept) −1.404∗∗ −1.654∗∗ −1.151
(0.461) (0.571) (0.639)
Impaired 0.607 0.764 0.176
(0.504) (0.598) (0.626)
Informal 2001 −0.133 0.054 0.177
(0.412) (0.406) (0.393)
Informal 2002 −1.128 −0.619 −0.955
(0.838) (0.685) (1.103)




Mean Exceed. 2001 0.103 0.138∗ −0.006
(0.063) (0.069) (0.038)
Mean Exceed. 2002 0.006 0.036 0.030
(0.004) (0.020) (0.021)
Mean Exceed. 2003 0.015 0.028
(0.011) (0.040)
Mean Exceed. 2004 −0.393
(0.626)
Max. Exceed. 2001 −0.071 −0.096∗ −0.003
(0.044) (0.048) (0.013)
Max. Exceed. 2002 −0.002 −0.017 −0.015
(0.001) (0.011) (0.012)
Max. Exceed. 2003 −0.003 −0.023
(0.002) (0.038)
Max. Exceed. 2004 0.084
(0.129)
Log-likelihood −22.870 −19.988 −14.378
N 67 67 67
standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figures
Figure 1: Industry and EPA in Illinois
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A.1 Independence Test for Inspection Types
The following are the results of the test for independence of non-memoryless (different from a
Poisson process) comprehensive inspections and non-memoryless reconnaissance inspections
performed on the whole dataset (275 facilities). The null hypothesis states that variables
outcomes are statistically independent.
Pearson’s Chi-squared test with Yates’ continuity correction:
χ2 = 0.0053, df = 1, pvalue = 0.942
We cannot reject the null hypothesis and conclude that having non-memoryless compre-
hensive inspections and having non-memoryless reconnaissance inspections are independent
processes.
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A.2 Evolution of Environmental Inspections
Inspection activities appear to have changed over the recent years in Illinois. There is a
general decreasing trend in the number of inspection in all jurisdictions (Table A.1).
Table A.1: Facility Average Number of Inspections by Year across Jurisdictions
Jurisdiction 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1 9.04 8.68 8.39 8.00 7.50 7.86 7.89 4.18 2.46
2 5.02 6.17 6.17 5.13 5.87 2.21 1.40 1.02 0.85
3 12.69 12.12 5.19 2.84 5.78 3.78 1.25 1.09 0.34
4 8.48 8.36 6.72 6.28 8.56 7.00 7.24 3.00 3.20
5 12.30 10.85 10.30 9.05 9.00 9.15 9.85 4.65 3.05
6 7.82 11.21 10.96 8.96 10.61 9.93 9.36 5.04 4.71
7 11.95 12.24 11.24 8.81 10.43 9.48 8.33 5.48 4.48
Usage of inspection types also change over the period 2001-2009. Figure A.1 shows the
proportions of each inspection type for jurisdiction 1, corresponding to the northwestern
corner of Illinois. We observe that reconnaissance inspections started to comprise water
sampling in 2007. Figure A.2 shows that jurisdiction 2, corresponding to the Chicago area,
has a different evolution with an increase of the proportion of comprehensive inspections.
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Figure A.1: Evolution of Inspection Types in Jurisdiction 1
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Figure A.2: Evolution of Inspection Types in Jurisdiction 2
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Figure A.3: Facilities with Memoryless Comprehensive Inspections
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Figure A.4: Facilities with Memoryless Reconnaissance Inspections
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A.3 Evolution of Violations
Tables A.2 and A.3 present respectively the counts of violation per year per jurisdiction and
the facility-average counts of violation per year per jurisdiction.
Table A.2: Number of Violations per Year
Jurisdiction 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1 146 109 77 95 102 83 82 143 128
2 284 479 503 360 426 412 404 461 610
3 150 144 92 113 150 123 140 219 272
4 70 61 70 120 52 54 74 68 115
5 51 71 97 68 87 61 65 99 127
6 40 75 66 72 60 70 75 168 256
7 94 92 69 66 57 74 35 91 77
Table A.3: Violations per Facility (Average)
Jurisdiction 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1 5.21 3.89 2.75 3.39 3.64 2.96 2.93 5.11 4.57
2 2.35 3.96 4.16 2.98 3.52 3.40 3.34 3.81 5.04
3 4.69 4.50 2.88 3.53 4.69 3.84 4.38 6.84 8.50
4 2.80 2.44 2.80 4.80 2.08 2.16 2.96 2.72 4.60
5 2.55 3.55 4.85 3.40 4.35 3.05 3.25 4.95 6.35
6 1.43 2.68 2.36 2.57 2.14 2.50 2.68 6.00 9.14
7 4.48 4.38 3.29 3.14 2.71 3.52 1.67 4.33 3.67
A.4 Robustness Tests for OLS Regressions
As we use an OLS model to estimate the factors involved in the rate of inspection for
facilities randomly inspected over time, we perform a series of robustness tests. We first test
the model on three different time settings: we regress the rate of inspection during 2003-07
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with 1-year and 2-year lagged variables and repeat the estimation after shifting dependent
variable to 2004-08 and then 2005-09. Results are shown in Tables A.4 and A.5.
Our next robustness tests concern multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity. The former
is tested using the variance inflation factor (VIF) and the later is tested with the Breusch-
Pagan test. Both are performed within R with already existing functions. Table A.6 shows
the VIF results and Table A.7 shows the Breusch-Pagan test. There is no sign of mul-
collinearity, however models for reconnaissance inspections for 2004-08 and 2005-09 have
heteroskedasticity. Thus, these models are corrected using White’s standard errors in Table
7.
A.5 Robustness Tests for Probit Regressions
Table A.8 shows the predictions of our different probit models. The fourth column contains
the percentage of correct predictions and the fifth column contains the percentage of the
largest observed value.
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Table A.4: OLS Regression of the Rate of Reconnaissance Inspection
2003-07 2004-08 2005-09




Formal 2002 −0.112 0.006
(0.171) (0.161)






Informal 2002 0.162∗ 0.110
(0.071) (0.070)




Travel Time (min) −0.004∗ −0.004∗ −0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Wastewater 0.795∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.153) (0.149)
Electric 0.310 0.362 0.376
(0.208) (0.203) (0.199)
Plastic 0.116 0.219 0.221
(0.376) (0.361) (0.390)
R-squared 0.175 0.178 0.159
Log-likelihood −288.202 −269.785 −229.953
N 253 248 215
standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.5: OLS Regression of the Rate of Comprehensive Inspections
2003-07 2004-08 2005-09




Formal 2002 0.059∗ 0.034
(0.026) (0.024)






Informal 2002 0.011 0.004
(0.010) (0.011)




Travel Time (min) −5.314e−4∗ −5.024e−4∗ −3.802e−4
(2.405e−4) (2.251e−4) (2.218e−4)
Wastewater 0.041 0.051∗ 0.051∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
Electric −0.012 0.001 0.013
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Plastic 0.051 0.033 −0.014
(0.050) (0.048) (0.047)
R-squared 0.115 0.128 0.096
Log-likelihood 192.440 213.377 217.890
N 216 227 226
standard errors in parentheses














































































































































































































































































Table A.7: Heteroskedasticity Test for OLS Regressions
Model Breusch-Pagan Test df p value
Rec. 2003-07 8.156 8 0.4184
Rec. 2004-08 19.087 8 0.0144
Rec. 2005-09 28.687 8 0.00036
Comp. 2003-07 10.942 8 0.205
Comp. 2004-08 5.168 8 0.7395
Comp. 2005-09 4.575 8 0.8019
Table A.8: Prediction of Probit Models
Model N Hit % Correct % Largest Value
Comprehensive 2003-07 W 208 161 77.40 75.96
Comprehensive 2004-08 W 208 171 82.21 81.73
Comprehensive 2005-09 W 208 169 81.25 80.77
Comprehensive 2003-07 O 67 57 85.07 86.57
Comprehensive 2004-08 O 67 58 86.57 85.07
Comprehensive 2005-09 O 67 61 91.04 86.57
W: Wastewater, O:Other
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A.6 Proportions of Memoryless Inspections
The following tables show the proportions of facilities with non-memoryless inspections over
different time windows.
Table A.9: Non-Memoryless Inspections of Facilities from 2001 to 2005 (Proportions)
Facilities Recon. Insp. Compr. Insp.
Jurisdiction Total Wastewater Total Wastewater Total Wastewater
1 28 21 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.29
2 121 98 0.02 0.00 0.22 0.22
3 32 21 0.12 0.14 0.47 0.57
4 25 17 0.04 0.06 0.32 0.41
5 20 13 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.38
6 28 21 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.48
7 21 17 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.41
Table A.10: Non-Memoryless Inspections of Facilities from 2002 to 2006 (Proportions)
Facilities Recon. Insp. Compr. Insp.
Jurisdiction Total Wastewater Total Wastewater Total Wastewater
1 28 21 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.19
2 121 98 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.15
3 32 21 0.31 0.33 0.50 0.48
4 25 17 0.04 0.06 0.36 0.53
5 20 13 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.15
6 28 21 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.29
7 21 17 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.35
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Table A.11: Non-Memoryless Inspections of Facilities from 2003 to 2007 (Proportions)
Facilities Recon. Insp. Compr. Insp.
Jurisdiction Total Wastewater Total Wastewater Total Wastewater
1 28 21 0.04 0.05 0.29 0.33
2 121 98 0.02 0.01 0.13 0.13
3 32 21 0.56 0.67 0.34 0.33
4 25 17 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.41
5 20 13 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.08
6 28 21 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.43
7 21 17 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.35
Table A.12: Non-Memoryless Inspections of Facilities from 2004 to 2008 (Proportions)
Facilities Recon. Insp. Compr. Insp.
Jurisdiction Total Wastewater Total Wastewater Total Wastewater
1 28 21 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.29
2 121 98 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
3 32 21 0.50 0.52 0.34 0.24
4 25 17 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.18
5 20 13 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.23
6 28 21 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.33
7 21 17 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.35
Table A.13: Non-Memoryless Inspections of Facilities from 2005 to 2009 (Proportions)
Facilities Recon. Insp. Compr. Insp.
Jurisdiction Total Wastewater Total Wastewater Total Wastewater
1 28 21 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.38
2 121 98 0.31 0.37 0.08 0.09
3 32 21 0.66 0.71 0.31 0.19
4 25 17 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.24
5 20 13 0.05 0.08 0.20 0.31
6 28 21 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.24




B.1 SQL Extraction From the ICIS-NPDES Database
This section presents the SQL queries used to extract data from the ICIS-NPDES. After
downloading records from the EPA ECHO website, we create a database comprising one
SQL table for each ICIS-NPDES table (e.g. inspections, violations) and load the data into
them. The following queries then extract relevant variables for statistical analyses.
SQL Queries
select perexno, viotype, viocode, vioparm, vioparm_text, viomvdt, vioepct,
viovtcd, year(viomvdt) as year, month(viomvdt) as month
from ECHO.dmr_violations
where 2001 <= year(viomvdt) and year(viomvdt) <= 2009;
select perexno, acttypc, cpoa, f_sttldt, actsepa, f_enfcoac_text, t_enfcfpa,
t_enfcslp, t_enfctsa, t_enfccaa, year(f_sttldt), month(f_sttldt)
from ECHO.formal_enforcement_actions enf
where 2001 <= year(f_sttldt) and year(f_sttldt) < 2010;
select perexno, enftypc, enftype, enfdate, enfsepa, year(enfdate),
month(enfdate)
from ECHO.informal_enforcement_actions enf
where 2001 <= year(enfdate) and year(enfdate) < 2010;
select ins.perexno, codes.sic, cmpmoty, cmpaced,
year(cmpaced), month(cmpaced)
from ECHO.inspections ins
join ECHO.snc_naic_code codes on (ins.perexno = codes.perexno)
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where 2001 <= year(cmpaced) and year(cmpaced) < 2010;
B.2 Travel Duration with GoogleMaps in Python
# Facilities file contains lat/lon coordinates for each plant
# and lat/lon coordinates of the corresponding EPA office
from geopy import distance
from geopy import geocoders
from geopy.point import Point




outWriter = csv.writer(open(’facitiliestraveltime.csv’, ’wb’), \
quoting=csv.QUOTE_MINIMAL)
with open(’../data/facilities.csv’, "rb" ) as theFile:
reader = csv.DictReader( theFile )
for line in reader:
start = gmaps.latlng_to_address(float(line[’jurlat’]), \
float(line[’jurlon’]))
dest = gmaps.latlng_to_address(float(line[’lat’]), \
float(line[’lon’]))
correctedDest = re.sub(’Unnamed Rd, ’,’’,dest)
dirs = gmaps.directions(start, correctedDest)
time = dirs[’Directions’][’Duration’][’seconds’]
dist = dirs[’Directions’][’Distance’][’meters’]




B.3 Statistics and Econometrics with R











t.cc = (n-1) * S2 / X.mean
integral = pchisq(t.cc, n-1)








inspquarterly = merge(inspquarterly, Recon)
names(inspquarterly)[names(inspquarterly)=="y"]<-"Recon"
inspcountquart = read.csv("2001-2009-all-insp-recon-quarterid.csv")
inspcountquart = merge(inspquarterly,inspcountquart, all=TRUE)
inspcountquart[is.na(inspcountquart$nbinsp),]$nbinsp = 0
nbplant = dim(facilities)[1]
inspintvl = subset(inspcountquart, 17 <= quarterid & quarterid <= 36)
resultpoisson = data.frame(matrix(nrow=nbplant, ncol=7))
names(resultpoisson) <- c("perexno","juris","SIC","Rec.pval","Nrec.pval",
"meanrec","meancom")












resultpoisson[i,c(2:7)] <- c(facilities$juris[i], facilities$SIC[i],
Rec[3], Nrec[3], mrec, mcom)
}
resultpoisson$wastewat = 0
resultpoisson[resultpoisson$SIC == 4952,]$wastewat = 1
resultpoisson$RecNP = 0
resultpoisson[is.na(resultpoisson$Rec.pval)==FALSE &
resultpoisson$Rec.pval <= 0.1,]$RecNP = 1
resultpoisson$ComNP = 0
resultpoisson[is.na(resultpoisson$Nrec.pval)==FALSE &
resultpoisson$Nrec.pval <= 0.1,]$ComNP = 1
write.csv(resultpoisson, "facilities-poissonness.csv")
datacum = resultpoisson





# Table Non Poissonness of Inspections
resultpoisson$wastewat = 0
resultpoisson[resultpoisson$SIC == 4952,]$wastewat = 1
outputpoisson = summaryBy(perexno ~ juris + wastewat, data=facilities,
FUN=c(length))
names(outputpoisson)[names(outputpoisson)=="perexno.length"] = "nbPlants"
# Number of Non-Reconnaissance Inspections that do not follow
# a Poisson Process
plantsub = subset(resultpoisson, Nrec.pval <= 0.1)
temp = summaryBy(perexno ~ juris + wastewat, data=plantsub, FUN=c(length))
names(temp)[names(temp)=="perexno.length"] = "NrecNotPoisson"
outputpoisson = merge(outputpoisson, temp, all=TRUE)
outputpoisson[is.na(outputpoisson$NrecNotPoisson),]$NrecNotPoisson = 0
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# Number of Reconnaissance Inspections that do not follow Poisson Process
plantsub = subset(resultpoisson, Rec.pval <= 0.1)
temp = summaryBy(perexno ~ juris + wastewat, data=plantsub, FUN=c(length))
names(temp)[names(temp)=="perexno.length"] = "RecNotPoisson"
outputpoisson = merge(outputpoisson, temp, all=TRUE)
outputpoisson[is.na(outputpoisson$RecNotPoisson),]$RecNotPoisson = 0
temp = melt(outputpoisson, c("juris", "wastewat"))
result = cast(temp, juris ~ wastewat + variable)
result$nbPlantTot = result$‘0_nbPlants‘ + result$‘1_nbPlants‘
result$nbWaste = result$‘1_nbPlants‘
result$nbNotRandRecon = result$‘0_RecNotPoisson‘ +
result$‘1_RecNotPoisson‘
result$nbWasteNotRandRecon = result$‘1_RecNotPoisson‘




temp$propTotNRndRecon = temp$nbNotRandRecon / temp$nbPlantTot
temp$propWasNRndRecon = temp$nbWasteNotRandRecon / temp$nbWaste
temp$propTotNRndNrecon = temp$nbNotRandNrecon / temp$nbPlantTot
temp$propWasNRndNrecon = temp$nbWasteNotRandNrecon / temp$nbWaste
Poisson Process Analysis of Violations
# Poisson Test fot violations
vio = read.csv("2001-2009-all-vio-date-v2.csv")
v1 = merge(vio, facilities)
v1$quarterRel = (vio$month-1)%/%3 + 1




tmp = subset(v1, viocode != "E90")
t = summaryBy(perexno ~ perexno + quarterAbs, data=tmp, FUN=length)
names(t)[names(t)=="perexno.length"]<-"nbVioOverdue"
vioquarterly = merge(vioquarterly, t, by.x=c("perexno","quarterid"),
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by.y=c("perexno","quarterAbs") ,all.x=T)
tmp = subset(v1, viocode == "E90")
t = summaryBy(perexno ~ perexno + quarterAbs, data=tmp, FUN=length)
names(t)[names(t)=="perexno.length"]<-"nbVioLimit"
vioquarterly = merge(vioquarterly, t, by.x=c("perexno","quarterid"),
by.y=c("perexno","quarterAbs") ,all.x=T)
#TSS
tmp = subset(v1, vioparm==530)
t = summaryBy(perexno ~ perexno + quarterAbs, data=tmp, FUN=length)
names(t)[names(t)=="perexno.length"]<-"nbVioTSS"
vioquarterly = merge(vioquarterly, t, by.x=c("perexno","quarterid"),
by.y=c("perexno","quarterAbs") ,all.x=T)
#Chlorine
tmp = subset(v1, vioparm==50060)
t = summaryBy(perexno ~ perexno + quarterAbs, data=tmp, FUN=length)
names(t)[names(t)=="perexno.length"]<-"nbVioChlo"
vioquarterly = merge(vioquarterly, t, by.x=c("perexno","quarterid"),
by.y=c("perexno","quarterAbs") ,all.x=T)
#BOD5
tmp = subset(v1, vioparm==310)
t = summaryBy(perexno ~ perexno + quarterAbs, data=tmp, FUN=length)
names(t)[names(t)=="perexno.length"]<-"nbVioBOD5"
vioquarterly = merge(vioquarterly, t, by.x=c("perexno","quarterid"),
by.y=c("perexno","quarterAbs") ,all.x=T)
#coliform
tmp = subset(v1, vioparm==74055)
t = summaryBy(perexno ~ perexno + quarterAbs, data=tmp, FUN=length)
names(t)[names(t)=="perexno.length"]<-"nbVioColi"
vioquarterly = merge(vioquarterly, t, by.x=c("perexno","quarterid"),
by.y=c("perexno","quarterAbs") ,all.x=T)
vioquarterly[is.na(vioquarterly)] <- 0
vioquarterly$quarterRel = vioquarterly$quarterid %% 4
vioquarterly[vioquarterly$quarterRel==0,]$quarterRel <- 4
tmp = summaryBy(nbVioOverdue + nbVioLimit + nbVioTSS + nbVioChlo




resultPoisVio = data.frame(matrix(nrow=nbplant, ncol=5))
names(resultPoisVio) <- c("perexno","juris","SIC","pval","meanVioColi")
for (i in 1:nbplant)
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resultPoisVio$pval <= 0.1,]$NPColi = 1
resultPoisTotal = merge(resultPoisTotal, resultPoisVio[c(-4)])
write.csv(resultPoisTotal, "ResultsPoissonViolation.csv")
output = summaryBy(perexno ~ juris, data=resultPoisTotal, FUN=length)
names(output)[names(output)=="perexno.length"]<-"nbFacility"








output = merge(output, summaryBy(perexno ~ juris,
data=subset(resultPoisTotal,
NPOverdue==1 & sicGroup==1), FUN=length),
all.x=T)
names(output)[names(output)=="perexno.length"]<-"nbNPOverdueWW"




output = merge(output, summaryBy(perexno ~ juris,
data=subset(resultPoisTotal, NPLimit==1 & sicGroup==1),
FUN=length), all.x=T)
names(output)[names(output)=="perexno.length"]<-"nbNPLimitWW"




output = merge(output, summaryBy(perexno ~ juris,
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data=subset(resultPoisTotal, NPTSS==1 & sicGroup==1),
FUN=length), all.x=T)
names(output)[names(output)=="perexno.length"]<-"nbNPTSSWW"




output = merge(output, summaryBy(perexno ~ juris,
data=subset(resultPoisTotal, NPChlo==1 & sicGroup==1),
FUN=length), all.x=T)
names(output)[names(output)=="perexno.length"]<-"nbNPChloWW"




output = merge(output, summaryBy(perexno ~ juris,
data=subset(resultPoisTotal, NPBOD5==1 & sicGroup==1),
FUN=length), all.x=T)
names(output)[names(output)=="perexno.length"]<-"nbNPBOD5WW"




output = merge(output, summaryBy(perexno ~ juris,




output$pctOverdue = output$nbNPOverdue / output$nbFacility
output$pctOverdueWW = output$nbNPOverdueWW / output$nbWasteWater
output$pctLimit = output$nbNPLimit / output$nbFacility
output$pctLimitWW = output$nbNPLimitWW / output$nbWasteWater
output$pctTSS = output$nbNPTSS / output$nbFacility
output$pctTSSWW = output$nbNPTSSWW / output$nbWasteWater
output$pctChlo = output$nbNPChlo / output$nbFacility
output$pctChloWW = output$nbNPChloWW / output$nbWasteWater
output$pctBOD5 = output$nbNPBOD5 / output$nbFacility
output$pctBOD5WW = output$nbNPBOD5WW / output$nbWasteWater
output$pctColi = output$nbNPColi / output$nbFacility
output$pctColiWW = output$nbNPColiWW / output$nbWasteWater
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OLS Regression of the Rate of Inspection
inspintvl = subset(inspcountquart, 9 <= quarterid & quarterid <= 28)




facIR = cast(insprate, perexno ~ Recon)
names(facIR)[names(facIR)=="C"] = "IRC0307"
names(facIR)[names(facIR)=="R"] = "IRR0307"
datacum <- merge(datacum, facIR, all.x=T)
inspintvl = subset(inspcountquart, 13 <= quarterid & quarterid <= 32)




facIR = cast(insprate, perexno ~ Recon)
names(facIR)[names(facIR)=="C"] = "IRC0408"
names(facIR)[names(facIR)=="R"] = "IRR0408"
datacum <- merge(datacum, facIR, all.x=T)
inspintvl = subset(inspcountquart, 17 <= quarterid & quarterid <= 36)




facIR = cast(insprate, perexno ~ Recon)
names(facIR)[names(facIR)=="C"] = "IRC0509"
names(facIR)[names(facIR)=="R"] = "IRR0509"
datacum <- merge(datacum, facIR, all.x=T)
datacum = merge(datacum, facilities, all.x=T)
datacum$impaired = 0
datacum[datacum$S303D == "Y",]$impaired = 1
datacum$wastewat = 0
datacum[datacum$SIC == 4952,]$wastewat = 1
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datacum$elec = 0
datacum[datacum$SIC == 4911,]$elec = 1
datacum$plastic = 0
datacum[datacum$SIC == 2821,]$plastic = 1
temp = subset(datacum, NPR0307==0)
OLS.R3 = lm(IRR0307 ~ E01 + E02 + IE01 + IE02
+ travMin + wastewat + elec + plastic, data=temp)
temp = subset(datacum, NPR0408==0)
OLS.R4 = lm(IRR0408 ~ E02 + E03 + IE02 + IE03
+ travMin + wastewat + elec + plastic, data=temp)
temp = subset(datacum, NPR0509==0)
OLS.R5 = lm(IRR0509 ~ E03 + E04 + IE03 + IE04
+ travMin + wastewat + elec + plastic, data=temp)
temp = subset(datacum, NPC0307==0)
OLS.C3 = lm(IRC0307 ~ E01 + E02 + IE01 + IE02
+ travMin + wastewat + elec + plastic, data=temp)
temp = subset(datacum, NPC0408==0)
OLS.C4 = lm(IRC0408 ~ E02 + E03 + IE02 + IE03
+ travMin + wastewat + elec + plastic, data=temp)
temp = subset(datacum, NPC0509==0)
OLS.C5 = lm(IRC0509 ~ E03 + E04 + IE03 + IE04
+ travMin + wastewat + elec + plastic, data=temp)
























Probit Models for the Probability of Non-Random Inspections
probit.R5 <- glm(NPR0509 ~ IE01 + IE02 + IE03 + IE04
+ V_bot_2001 + V_bot_2002
+ V_bot_2003 + V_bot_2004
+ V_clo_2001 + V_clo_2002
+ V_clo_2003 + V_clo_2004
+ V_col_2001 + V_col_2002
+ V_col_2003 + V_col_2004
+ V_ddl_2001 + V_ddl_2002
+ V_ddl_2003 + V_ddl_2004
+ V_tss_2001 + V_tss_2002
+ V_tss_2003 + V_tss_2004
+ travtime
+ impaired + noTSS + noChlo + noBOD5
, family=binomial(link="probit"), data=datacum)
probit.R4 <- glm(NPR0408 ~ IE01 + IE02 + IE03
+ V_bot_2001
+ V_bot_2002 + V_bot_2003
+ V_clo_2001
+ V_clo_2002 + V_clo_2003
+ V_col_2001 +
+ V_col_2002 + V_col_2003
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+ V_ddl_2001
+ V_ddl_2002 + V_ddl_2003
+ V_tss_2001
+ V_tss_2002 + V_tss_2003
+ travtime
+ impaired + noTSS + noChlo + noBOD5
, family=binomial(link="probit"), data=datacum)
probit.R3 <- glm(NPR0307 ~ IE01 + IE02
+ V_bot_2001 + V_bot_2002
+ V_clo_2001 + V_clo_2002
+ V_col_2001 + V_col_2002
+ V_ddl_2001 + V_ddl_2002
+ V_tss_2001 + V_tss_2002
+ travtime
+ impaired + noTSS + noChlo + noBOD5
,family=binomial(link="probit"), data=datacum)
tmp = mtable(probit.R3, probit.R4, probit.R5)
temp = subset(datacum, wastewat == 1)
probit.C5 <- glm(NPC0509 ~ impaired + perdflw + nonpotw
+ pretreat + critical
+ IE01 + IE02 + IE03 + IE04,
family=binomial(link="probit"), data=temp)
probit.C4 <- glm(NPC0408 ~ impaired + perdflw + nonpotw
+ pretreat + critical
+ IE01 + IE02 + IE03,
family=binomial(link="probit"), data=temp)
probit.C3 <- glm(NPC0307 ~ impaired + perdflw + nonpotw
+ pretreat + critical
+ IE01 + IE02,
family=binomial(link="probit"), data=temp)
tmp = mtable(probit.C5, probit.C4, probit.C3)
temp = subset(datacum, wastewat == 0)
probit.C5 <- glm(NPC0509 ~ impaired + pretreat + noBOD5
+ IE03 + IE04
+ MV_2003 + MV_2004
+ MaxV_2003 + MaxV_2004
, family=binomial(link="probit"), data=temp)
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probit.C4 <- glm(NPC0408 ~ impaired + pretreat + noBOD5
+ IE02 + IE03
+ MV_2002 + MV_2003
+ MaxV_2002 + MaxV_2003
, family=binomial(link="probit"), data=temp)
probit.C3 <- glm(NPC0307 ~ impaired + pretreat + noBOD5
+ IE01 + IE02
+ MV_2001 + MV_2002
+ MaxV_2001 + MaxV_2002
, family=binomial(link="probit"), data=temp)
tmp = mtable(probit.C5, probit.C4, probit.C3)
Independence Test for Inspection Types
# Independence Test for Reconnaissance / Compliance
library(MASS)
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